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A non-parametric index of corporate governance in the banking industry: 
An application to Indian data 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a methodological framework for c nstructing a non-parametric index of corporate 
governance for banks. The index is constructed by aggregating six distinct dimensional indices capturing 
different dimensions of corporate governance, namely board effectiveness, audit function, risk management, 
remuneration, shareholder rights and information, and disclosure and transparency. For aggregation, a tailored 
version of data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach which is popularly known as constrained ‘Benefit-o-the-
Doubt (BoD)’ model is employed. This approach is uniq e and distinctive in the sense that it requires no a 
priori knowledge of weights, and assigns endogenous weights obtained from actual data to individual 
dimensions of bank governance in order to construct a composite index of corporate governance. This 
methodological framework has illustrated by applying t for a data set of 40 Indian banks operating in the year 
2017. The data set has been compiled using 58 governance regulations as defined by relevant jurisdictions.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, especially after the global financi l risis of 2007-09, the issue of corporate 
governance of banks has attracted serious attention of policy makers and regulators across 
nations. It is argued that banks are ailing due to multiple agency distortions relating to both 
equity governance and debt governance (Heremans 2007). There is no doubt that any laxity 
of banks in adhering to governance regulatory norms affects their ability to withstand the 
shocks in the system and jeopardizes their growth momentum. In this context, an index of 
corporate governance for banks provides an indispensable tool, which is beneficial for all 
stakeholders. Such an index indicates how well banks are adhering to governance practices 
that are framed by relevant jurisdictions. A composite index of corporate governance 
compresses the range of governance indicators, which are defined in distinct dimensions of 
corporate governance such as board effectiveness, audit function, and others, into a single 
numerical score that could be easier for interpretation, and is a useful tool for benchmarking 
banks and enabling effective policy analysis. In addition, the changes in the corporate 
governance index facilitate regulators to judge how governance reforms are working (Sarkar 
et al. 2012).  
Thereby, the focus of this paper is to illustrate how data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
based benefit-of-the-doubt (BoD) model can be employed to derive a composite index of 
corporate governance for banks using a wide array of qualitative and quantitative regulatory 
norms to be adhered by the banks. In particular, we show how the dimensional indices 
capturing different dimensions of corporate governance of banks can be combined using the 
idiosyncratic and endogenous weights generated from the BoD model to construct a 
composite index of corporate governance. The dimensions that are considered in this study to 
construct a composite index of corporate governance for banks pertain to i) board 
effectiveness, ii) audit function, iii) risk managem nt, iv) remuneration, v) shareholder rights 
and information, and vi) disclosure and transparency. An illustration is also provided to show 
the construction of corporate governance index for 40 Indian banks using data related to 58 
governance norms that banks have to adhere to under relevant regulatory jurisdictions. 
Note here that there exists an implicit institutional framework for governance of banks 
in India, which comprises the guidelines by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs under 
Companies Act, 1956 (recently amended in 2013), the Reserve Bank of India (India’s central 
















Obligations and Disclosure Requirements] Regulations, 2000 (recently amended in 2015). 
However, the formal attempt to reinforce corporate governance codes in the banking industry 
in India was initiated by the Reserve Bank of India with the constitution of Standing 
Committee on International Financial Standards and Co es: Advisory Group on Corporate 
Governance in 2000 (Chairman: R.H. Patil). The Committee recommended the Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation & Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance as a 
yardstick for Indian banks. Later, the Consultative Group of Director for Financial 
Supervision (Chairman: A.S. Ganguly) in 2002, and more recently the Committee to Review 
Governance of Boards of Banks in India in 2014 (Chairm n: P.J. Nayak) reviewed 
governance norms for banks in India. The expert committee under the chairmanship of P.J. 
Nayak recommended banks to comply with Clause 49 stated by the SEBI regulations, which 
is applicable for all the companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National 
Stock Exchange (NSE). To avoid the conflict of interest with their respective statutes by the 
government, the banking companies remain protected and exempted on a set of governance 
norms by the listing agency. In India, banks follow a one-tier board structure known as 
‘Anglo-American model’, where the board consists of b th executive and non-executive 
directors. The executive directors perform a manageri l role together with their accountability 
as members of the board of directors. In principle, th re is a fair separation of ownership and 
management in India.  
The key contribution of this research endeavour is that this is the first study to the best 
of authors’ knowledge, which proposes the use of DEA based BoD approach to construct a 
corporate governance index for banking firms. Befor this study, there has been no attempt to 
obtain a robust measure of corporate governance indx by using data-driven endogenous 
weighting system based on non-parametric linear programming methodology. The empirical 
research on the subject of construction of corporate governance index for banking industry is 
limited and is at an embryonic stage. Thus, this study contributes to scant literature on this 
subject. It is noteworthy here that earlier efforts on corporate governance index in banking 
used traditional approaches such as simple linear unweighted average method (see, for 
example, Love and Rachinsky 2015) or principal compnent analysis (PCA) (see, for 
instance, Song and Li 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Tarchouna et al. 2017; Andries et al. 
2018). The major limitation of unweighted method is that it relaxes the assumption of non-
compensability or non-substitutability of indicators. However, the use of PCA approach is 
inappropriate when sample size is not large, and the variation of a variable is very small 
(OECD 2008; Greco et al. 2018).  
In the literature on construction of composite indicators, the BoD approach has 
emerged as a most relevant and successful approach due to its desirable properties and 
advantages. A few notable advantages of BoD approach are: i) it allows the actual data to 
decide on the weights (OECD 2008), ii) it assigns a ingle numerical score to a range of 
dimensions (Rogge and Puyenbroeck 2007; Puyenbroeck 2018), iii) it is appropriate for small 
samples, iv) it is independent of a priori statistical assumptions and appropriate to aggregate 
the unit invariant data, and v) it allows endogenously calculated differential weighting and 
aggregation of dimensions simultaneously (Zhou et al. 2007; Greco et al. 2018).  
Owing to these aforementioned properties and advantages, the BoD has been applied 
for construction of composite indices in diverse fields. For example, Despotis (2005) used it 
for building a Human Development Index and Cherchye et al. (2008) constructed a Robust 
Human Development Index; Murias et al. (2006) crafted an Economic Wellbeing Index; 
Zhou et al. (2007) computed a Sustainable Energy Index; Hermans et al. (2008) obtained a 
Road-safety Index; Antonio and Martin (2012) built a Child Health Index; Badasyan et al. 
(2011) worked out a Broadband Achievement Index; Giambona and Vassallo (2013) 
















Access Index; Martin et al. (2017) constructed a  Travel-tourism Competitiveness Index. 
Since as noted above, we are not aware of any literature wherein the BoD approach has been 
applied for the construction of corporate governance index for individual banks, this study 
contributes to this knowledge. In particular, the pr sent study proposes the use of BoD as a 
robust approach for constructing an index of corporate governance for banking firms and 
shows how dimensional indices can be aggregated using the data-driven weights. We believe 
that researchers, policy makers and regulators would find our non-parametrically generated 
corporate governance index to be a handy tool for examining the differences in the levels of 
governance compliance across banks.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature review. 
Section 3 elaborates the DEA based constrained BoD m del used in this study. Section 4 
focuses on the different dimensions of corporate governance and their aggregation for index 
construction. The final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Corporate governance in banking: a relevant literature review 
Importance of good governance in non-banking firms ha long been advocated by the 
researchers (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Klapper and Love 2004). However, 
the role of governance in banking firms has received significant attention only in recent 
years, especially the aftermath of the global financi l crisis of 2007-09. Although the vast 
literature exists on discussing the qualitative aspects of corporate governance in banking 
(Caprio and Levine 2002; Adams and Mehran 2003; Adams 2011; Mehran et al. 2011; De 
Haan and Vlahu 2016), yet the empirical works on the quantification of corporate governance 
for banking firms are very limited (see Bozec and Bozec 2012 for a detailed review). It is 
argued that better corporate governance practices by banks could be able to restrain the 
multiple agency conflicts that may arise among stakeholders, that is either between 
shareholders and managers, and/or between controllig and minority shareholders, and/or 
between shareholders and creditors (Mülbert 2010). The literature also points out that the 
governance in banking firms differ from that in non-banking firms, mainly due to their 
opaque nature, asymmetry in information and moral hazard concerns (Becht et al. 2011). 
Therefore, the recent studies have shifted the focus n quantification through the construction 
of an aggregate index of corporate governance for banks distinctly. Table 1 reports empirical 
studies that made an attempt to construct corporate gov rnance indices for banking firms.  
We note that the previous literature reflects two key issues that are inherent in the 
construction of the composite index for corporate governance for banking firms. These issues 
pertain to: (i) the choice of indicators/dimensions for the construction of aggregate index, and 
(ii) index methodology for aggregation of indicators/dimensions. Most of the researchers 
relied on a self-structured framework, which is based on one or few sets of principle 
dimensions of corporate governance for the construction of composite index (see, for 
instance, Song and Li 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Love and Rachinsky 2015; Zagorchev 
and Gao 2015; Andries et al. 2018). There are also some studies where researchers used a 
structured framework developed by third-party (generally the rating agencies) to obtain 
composite indices for measuring the strength and quality of governance in banking firms. For 
example, Peni and Vӓhӓmaa (2012) used the Gov-Score corporate governance ind x 
developed by Brown and Caylor (2006), which was based on 51 governance indicators; Ellul 
and Yerramilli (2013) adopted 24 factors G-Index of Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) database that was developed by Gompers et al. (2003).  
A deeper scrutiny of the literature on corporate governance index for banking firms 
helps us to make following observations. First, the majority of the studies have constructed a 
composite index of corporate governance considering o ly one or few sets of internal 
















mechanisms in the construction of such an index. It is important to note that the 
contemporary literature on corporate governance shields a wide-array of governance 
mechanisms for banks covering both equity and debt governance concerns (Heremans 2007). 
Second, the studies have mainly employed the traditional unweighted method to construct 
corporate governance index, which implicitly implies that weights are equal to one, ignoring 
the fact that all governance components may not be sharing equal policy priorities by banks. 
Our study is an attempt to rationally deliberate on the aforementioned issues in the literature 
on corporate governance in banking industry and proposes a holistic way to construct the 
corporate governance index for banking firms using the endogenously generated weights 
using the non-parametric methodological framework.   
 
Table 1: Studies on the construction of corporate governance index for banks 
Author (Year) Sample (Period) Governance mechanisms Methodological 
framework  
Peni and  Vӓhӓmaa (2012) 61 US large 
publicly traded 
banks (2005) 
Gov-Score index by Brown and Caylor 
(2006) based on 51 governance attributes, 
with each attribute as defined as binary 
variables 
Linear unweighted 
average index  
Song and Li (2012) 48 nations Self-structured index based on 15 variables 
related to board structure, ownership structure, 








G-Index of IRRC database developed by 
Gompers et al. (2003) and Risk Management 
Index based on six risk governance attributes 
Principal component 
analysis (PCA) 
Love and Rachinsky (2015) Russian and 
Ukrainian banks 
Self-structured index based on 26 indicators 
relating to five categories- commitment to 
corporate governance, shareholders’ rights, 









CG41 index based on 41 governance 
components for which data are available in 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) and RiskMetrics’ 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). This 
index comprises of four sub-groups: (a) board, 
(b) audit, (c) anti-takeover provisions, and (d) 
compensation and ownership. 
Linear unweighted 
average index 




Self-structured index based on four 








Self-structured index based on five corporate 
governance variables- board size, the board 
independence, the CEO duality, the majority 




Andrieș et al. (2018) 17 CEE nations 
(2005-2012) 
Self-structured index based on four 
supervisory board and four risk management 
variables 
Principal component 
analysis (PCA)  
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
3. Data Envelopment Analysis based constrained ‘Benfit-of-the-Doubt’ model 
This section presents the constrained BoD model used in this study for constructing a 
corporate governance index for individual banks. Based on Farrell’s (1957) seminal work, 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) developed the first DEA model to assess relative 
efficiencies of peer decision-making units (DMUs) in a non-parametric framework, which 
allows multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Over the years, several theoretical contributions 
and extensions have been made in DEA modelling. Amongst these extensions, one of the 
















endogenous weights to aggregate the various dimensions of performance. The BoD 
modelling approach was originally proposed by Melyn a d Moesen (1991) and later 
developed by Cherchye et al. (2004, 2007). To be more precise, a BoD model is akin to DEA 
model and aims to aggregate linearly quantitative performance indicators to construct a single 
composite index when exact weights are not known a priori (Cherchye et al. 2007). In the 
BoD model, the composite index is constructed by treating all the dimensions/indicators as 
outputs, thereby considering no inputs in the model (Lovell et al. 1995).  In fact, a BoD 
model compares the actual performance of the unit with an internal benchmark rather than an 
external benchmark that could not be realistically chievable in the specific local context 
(Giambona and Vassallo 2013). In fact, in the absence of true weights, BoD automatically 
assigns the benefit-of-the-doubt weights determined by the data to each characteristic in order 
to build up the composite score, one for each unit (W te and Rogge 2011). 
The constrained BoD model that has been used in the present study is an extension of 
the basic BoD model. This model retrieves the information on appropriate weights from the 
observed data, and aggregates the distinct dimensions of corporate governance of banks. The 
constrained BoD model is a bank-specific model and needs to be solved for each bank in the 
sample separately so that we can get endogenously computed weights that vary across banks 
and dimensions. For a typical bank, the essence of the BoD model is to maximize the weights 
such that the bank’s corporate governance performance is as high as possible. Thus, BoD 
provides the weights that maximise (minimise) the impact of the dimension of corporate 
governance where the bank performs relatively good (poor) compared to the other banks. 
Hence, endogenously generated weights from our BoD model are optimal and yield the 
maximum value of composite index of corporate governance performance for a bank.    
To formulate the basic BoD model, we assume that 1,...,j n=  refers to banks, 
1,...,i m=  refers to corporate governance dimensions I , and w refers to weights such that 





=∑ The  linear programming formulation of the basic BoD model 







max                                (1)
subject to
1             1,..., ;                  (2)                                    (A)
0                    
i o
m

















1,...,                    (3)i m=
 
The optimal solution of Model (A) provides the observed value of the composite index of 
corporate governance for the bank o in terms of all the underlying dimensions. A few things 
are noteworthy here. First, oCGI lies between 0 (the worst performance among the banks in 
the sample) and 1 (the best performance). Second, we solve Model (A) n times once for each 
bank to obtain a set of composite indices 1 2, ,..., nCGI CGI CGI  for n sampled banks. Third, 
,i ow  are non-negative bank-specific endogenous weights. In Model (A), the weights are 
selected in such a way as to maximize the value of the composite indicator of the evaluated 
bank. This, in turn, guarantees that any other weightin  scheme would worsen the ranking of 
this bank. Moreover, when these weights are used by any other bank in the sample would not 
result in a composite indicator greater than one (Thanassoulis et al. 2016). Fourth, in the 
construction of oCGI , bank o has always the highest possible scores in relation to ther banks 
in the sample. Thus, a good or bad position of a bank does not depend on a good or bad 
















(Giambona and Vassallo 2013). Fifth, Model (A) avoids the subjectiveness in determining 
weights, and therefore, provides a relatively objectiv  performance score for each sampled 
bank (Zhou et al. 2007). 
Cherchye et al. (2004) note that since the BoD approach uses data-generated weights, 
therefore, one or few dimensions may get overemphasized or ignored. This situation arises 
when optimization procedure assigns zero weights to one or more dimensions and that get 
ignored in the aggregation procedure. Charles and Díaz (2017) argue that this situation arises 
because the units (here banks) are evaluated in the best possible light in the basic ‘BoD’ 
model. Therefore, the computed composite indices tend to overfocus on the dimension in 
which the unit performs the best and completely discard the information of the others. In 
order to avoid such situations in the construction of a composite index, additional weight 
restrictions are imposed on endogenous weights, which set lower and upper bounds on the 
contribution of a particular dimension (see, Wong and Beasley 1990; Allen et al. 1997; 
Athanassoglou 2016, for more details). Inclusion of c nstraint (4) as follows, in the basic 
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where ,i jL  and ,i jU  represent lower and upper bound on endogenous weight assigned to 
thi
dimension for jth unit. The similar model is used by Badasyan et al. (2011) and Giambona and 
Vassallo (2013). In the present study, we set lower bound as 10 percent, and the upper limit is 
assigned accordingly. For example, if lower bound is 0.10 (i.e., 10%) for five dimensions, the 
proportional contribution for sixth dimension will be at 1-(5×0.10) = 0.5 (i.e., 50%). 
Incorporating weight restrictions in the above manner ot only overcomes the major flaw of 
overfocusing on the best performing dimension in the basic BoD model but also tackle the 
problem of the presence of outliers on composite index scores to a large extent since no 
dimension is ignored in the aggregation process. As BoD is sensitive to the dimensional score 
of zero and one, therefore, before aggregating eachdimensional index ,i jI is normalized (at 
mean 100 and standard deviation 10) to account for zero and one values of ,i jI  dimension 
(Vidoli and Fusco 2018)1. In the present study, the weight constrained BoD model is 
estimated using the command ‘ci_bod_constr’ in Compind package using R software (see 
Appendix A for R codes used for running the constrained BoD model).  
 
4. Construction of corporate governance index for Indian banks: An illustration 
4.1 Data, governance norms and dimensional indices 
In order to provide an illustration of how the corpate governance index is computed by 
using the constrained BoD model, the first step involves collection of data on distinct 
governance norms adhered to by banks in India. Here, we consider 58 governance norms. 
The relevant qualitative and quantitative information on 58 governance indicators for 40 
listed banks operating in the year 2017 had been obtained from two different sources. The 
first and primary source is ‘Corporate Governance Report’ of a sampled bank. Note here that 
this report is an integral part of the annual report of a bank, which is generally publically 
available on the home page of the bank’s website. The second data source is SANSCO 
database and the ‘Corporate Governance’ section of the NSE website. We use this source for 
obtaining and supplementing missing annual reports and data information. In total, we 
                                                          
















collected 40 annual reports and thoroughly read these r ports to gather data on 58 governance 
indicators. Thus, we have 2,320 (i.e., 40×58) observations in total. 
The definition, coding and grouping of the selected governance norms for the 
construction of corporate governance index is provided in the Table B1 of Appendix B. In the 
second step, each governance indicator is coded as a binary variable with a value of one 
implying that a bank complies with the governance regulation, and zero otherwise. In the 
third step, we construct the dimensional indices. For this, all governance norms are grouped 
under six mutually exclusive categories based upon the key principles of corporate 
governance for banks, including board effectiveness, audit function, risk management, 
remuneration, shareholder rights and information, and disclosure and transparency. Figure 1 
illustrates the framework for bank governance used in the present study. Dimensional indices 
corresponding to each dimension of bank governance are obtained.  In the final step, a 
composite index of corporate governance is constructed by aggregating the six dimensional 
indices. A discussion of the dimensional indices of c rporate governance for banks is 
warranted and is elaborated below.  
I. Index for Board Effectiveness: A bank board with ideal size and optimal 
combination of inside (full-time executive) and outside (non-executive affiliated 
and non-affiliated) directors is expected to be more effective in monitoring 
management and resolving agency conflicts and contribute to superior bank 
efficiency (Financial Stability Board 2017). Board effectiveness is assessed on 20 
indicators pertaining to its composition, structure (presence of qualified and 
independent board level committees), independence (well-trained and certified 
non-executive independent directors on the board) and conduct (culture of 
reinforcing ethical board conduct). 
II.  Index for Audit Function: An audit committee is essential for an independent audit 
process, which is assumed to provide a better oversight of the bank’s financial 
reporting process, effectively monitor the internal and statutory audits, and the 
auditor’s independence. A total of 9 governance indicators related to auditing and 
auditor functioning are used in this study to examine compliance on this 
dimension. Higher value of this dimensional index rpresents tight audit controls 
within the bank. 
III.  Index for Risk Management: Based on the recommendations by the “Consultative 
Group of Directors of Banks/Financial Institutions” (Chairman: A.S. Ganguly), 
Indian banks constitute the board level stand-alone risk management committee to 
independently monitor the risk policy and strategy for a bank. Banks also appoint 
the Chief Risk Officer to efficiently monitor and mitigate internal risks. To 
construct a dimensional index of risk management, we use 5 risk governance 
indicators. Higher value of this dimensional index represents a tight risk 
management structure within the bank.  
IV.  Index for Remuneration: It has been argued that independent non-executive 
directors are needed to be engaged in deciding payment of incentives to whole-
time executives, and shareholders be kept informed of the remuneration policies 
and structures. This is imperative to counteract the managers’ natural risk-
aversion, and remuneration gives them incentives to take risk and maximise their 
wealth. It is also important that excessive risk taing by the manager must be 
controlled. This dimension is assessed on 5 governance guidelines pertaining to 
remuneration to directors.  
V. Index for Shareholder Rights and Information: Large shareholders can influence 
the decisions of management/board and control them to protect their investments 
















protect interests of minority shareholders and investors, the jurisdictions advised 
banks to constitute a separate stakeholder’s grievances committee with a non-
executive director as chairman and company secretary as compliance officer of 
the committee. All the grievances or complaints of investors should be the 
responsibility of the committee. This dimension is captured by using 11 relevant 
governance norms. 
VI.  Index for Disclosure and Transparency: An adequate disclosure and transparency 
of inside information to outside stakeholders is another important principle of 
effective governance (BCBS 2015). As mandated by law and regulations, a bank 
is required to disclose the quality and quantity information in the annual report to 
mitigate agency problems arising from information asymmetry and enhances 
market discipline of banks (Tadesse 2006). The compliance on disclosure and 
transparency is evaluated on a set of 8 indicators. 
 
Figure 1: The framework for bank governance  
4.2 Construction of corporate governance index for Indian banks 
In the present study, we calculate a composite index of corporate governance for banks by 
combining six distinct dimensional indices using a non-parametric methodological 
framework. In the first step, we adopt a linear unweighted average method for constructing 
dimensional indices. The use of this method is popular among researchers to construct not 
only dimensional indices, but also an overall index of corporate governance (see, for 
example, Bhagat et al. 2010; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Bozec and Bozec 2012 in case of non-
banking firms and Love and Rachinsky 2015 for Russian and Ukrainian banks). In the second 
step, we differ from the aforementioned studies. In particular, we aggregate dimensional 
indices that we obtained in the first step by using a DEA based BoD model that assigns 
endogenous weights to each dimensional index in the process of aggregation2. A detailed 
discussion on the methodological framework used in the present study is elaborated in 
subsequent sections. 
 
4.2.1 Construction of dimensional indices of corporate governance 
                                                          
2 Use of mixed approach is quite common in the construction of a composite index in the social policy research 
literature. For example, the Multidimensional Poverty Assessment Tool (UNIFAD, 2010) and the Food and 
Nutrition Security Index (FAO, 2014) are obtained using the linear arithmetic average within a sub-comp nent 
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As noted above, we employ the widely used linear unweighted average method for 
computing dimensional indices. It is important to nte here that we rely on this method to 
obtain dimensional indices because the response on many governance norms is qualitative in 
nature. This approach provides an index value for each dimension, which varies from zero to 
one. The dimensional indices are calculated by using the following formula:  
,1














where { }1 2, ,...,r sy y y y=  and ,r jy =1 if a bank is compliant to the thr  indicator/norm of 
corporate governance, ,e js = total maximum expected score of the corporate governance for 
thj bank in thm  dimension. This approach is adopted to obtain six dimensional indices as 
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Table 2 reports non-normalized values of dimensional indices of corporate 
governance, where index value is suggestive of areas of high or low governance priority for 
the banks. Among all the dimensions, on an average, hi her level of regulatory compliance 
by banks is observed on the shareholder rights and information (dimension V) followed by 
disclosure and transparency (dimension VI). This is clear from the value of indices for 
dimensions V and VI as 0.927 and 0.903. An average ind x value for dimensions I and III is 
relatively low. This reflects that there is weak governance by banks on board effectiveness 
and audit function. We believe that the recently repo ted big-ticket fraud cases in Indian 
banking industry are primarily due to poor governance of banks in these two important 
dimensions of bank governance.  Further, banks are 25.5 percent less efficient on risk 
governance in the sampled year. Only 18 banks (45% of sampled banks) attained the 
dimensional index score of one on governance guidelines pertaining to disclosure and 
transparency, 15 banks (37.5% of sampled banks) on hareholder rights and information, 11 
banks (27.5% of sampled banks) on risk management, 10 banks (25% of sampled banks) on 
audit quality while none on board effectiveness. Further, although banks have performed well 
on protecting shareholder rights and maintaining disclosures, 45% of sampled banks 
performed below average on audit and risk functions.  
We also note substantial differences in bank’s obedience to governance regulatory 
provisions. Our findings suggest that a bank could be better governed with respect to one 
dimension but relatively worse on another. For insta ce, Yes Bank Ltd. is compliant (,i jI =1) 
















found to be outperforming this bank in this regard. In addition, three banks, namely Jammu & 
Kashmir Ltd., United Bank of India and State Bank of India attained the index score less than 
one ( ,i jI <1) on all six dimensions. This may be due to lacune in reporting practices. Falling 
short on all dimensions of bank governance could be a challenge for very large public sector 
banks such as State Bank of India, which however can be addressed through investing human 
and financial resources for prioritising reporting. 
 
Table 2: Dimensional indices of corporate governance using linear unweighted average method for the year 2017 
 Dimensions→ I II III IV V VI 
Bank 
code 
Bank name↓ Index of  
Board 
Effectiveness 
Index of  
Audit 
Function 
Index of  
Risk 
Management 
Index of  
Remuneration 








B1 Allahabad Bank 0.800 0.778 0.600 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B2 Andhra Bank 0.850 0.778 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.000 
B3 Axis Bank Ltd. 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.909 0.875 
B4 Bandhan Bank Ltd. 0.650 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.636 0.625 
B5 Bank of Baroda 0.650 0.778 0.800 0.800 1.000 0.875 
B6 Bank of India 0.725 0.556 0.600 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B7 Bank of Maharashtra 0.750 0.778 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.000 
B8 Canara Bank 0.725 0.667 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.875 
B9 Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 0.700 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.636 0.875 
B10 Central Bank of India 0.600 0.778 0.600 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B11 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.900 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.909 0.750 
B12 Corporation Bank 0.700 0.889 0.600 0.200 1.000 1.000 
B13 DCB Bank Ltd. 0.925 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.909 0.875 
B14 Dena Bank 0.650 0.667 0.600 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B15 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd 0.950 0.778 0.800 1.000 0.909 1.000 
B16 Federal Bank Ltd 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.875 
B17 HDFC Bank Ltd. 0.900 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.909 0.875 
B18 ICICI Bank Ltd. 0.750 0.889 0.800 1.000 1.000 0.75  
B19 IDBI Bank Limited 0.750 0.889 1.000 0.800 0.909 0.750 
B20 IDFC Bank Ltd. 0.825 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
B21 Indian Bank 0.800 0.778 1.000 0.800 0.818 1.000 
B22 Indian Overseas Bank 0.725 0.778 0.400 0.800 1.000 1.000 
B23 IndusInd Bank Ltd. 0.925 0.889 0.800 1.000 0.909 0.875 
B24 Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.600 0.667 0.600 0.80  0.909 0.875 
B25 Karnataka Bank Ltd. 0.775 1.000 0.600 1.000 0.909 0.750 
B26 Karur Vysya Bank Ltd 0.950 0.889 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.875 
B27 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 0.875 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.909 0.875 
B28 Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 0.850 0.778 0.800 1.000 0.909 0.750 
B29 Oriental Bank of Commerce 0.700 0.889 0.600 0.80  1.000 1.000 
B30 Punjab and Sind Bank 0.650 0.778 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.000 
B31 Punjab National Bank 0.800 0.889 0.800 0.800 1.000 0.875 
B32 RBL Bank Ltd. 0.850 0.889 0.600 1.000 0.818 0.875 
B33 South Indian Bank Ltd. 0.900 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
B34 State Bank of India 0.650 0.778 0.800 0.800 0.909 0.750 
B35 Syndicate Bank 0.675 0.556 0.800 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B36 UCO Bank 0.750 0.667 0.600 0.800 0.909 1.000 
B37 Union Bank of India 0.600 0.889 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.000 
B38 United Bank of India 0.725 0.889 0.600 0.800 0.909 0.875 
B39 Vijaya Bank 0.800 0.778 0.800 0.800 1.000 0.750 
B40 Yes Bank Ltd. 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.909 1.000 
Mean 0.775 0.845 0.745 0.870 0.927 0.903 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4.2.2 Aggregation of dimensional indices to construct a corporate governance index 
After obtaining six distinct dimensional indices, the constrained BoD model is used to 
generate idiosyncratic and endogenous weights, which aggregates normalised values of 
dimensional indices to obtain a corporate governance i dex (CGI) for individual banks. As 
noted above, this approach is unique in the sense that it is simpler and generates weights 
based on actual data. The estimated values of corporate governance index for sampled banks 
and their rankings across different methods of index construction are reported in Table 3. 
















percent lower bound restriction. The weight’s matrix w th this restriction is given in the Table 
C1 of Appendix C. An index of corporate governance for each bank is expected to lie 
between a minimum of 0 (the worst governed) and the maximum of 1 (the best governed)3. 
We note that corporate governance index value at 10 percent weight restriction (CGIBOD_0.10) 
varies from a minimum of 0.8634 to a maximum of 1, implying a considerably high level of 
banks’ adherence to governance regulations set by the jurisdictions in the sampled year. A 
persistent regulatory oversight and a coercion to avoid any sort of penalties or strictures or 
restrictions in business operations in recent years h ve compelled banks to show higher 
obedience to governance norms in the sampled year. Only three banks, namely South Indian 
Bank Ltd., IDFC Bank Ltd., and Federal Bank Ltd. attain the status of well governed banks 
(with CGIBOD_0.10 score of 1) and are found to be relative efficient in erms of adherence to 
corporate governance framework. Although these banks emerge as ideal benchmarks of bank 
governance in India, they do lack compliance on one r more dimensions of governance. For 
instance, South Indian Bank Ltd. is not well governed on the dimensions of board 
effectiveness (dimension I) and audit function (dimension II); IDFC Bank Ltd. lacks perfect 
governance on board effectiveness (dimension I); Federal Bank Ltd. is not well governed on 
disclosure and transparency (dimension VI) alongside weakness on board effectiveness 
(dimension I). The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. and Bandhan Bank Ltd. attain lower 
ranking on the basis of their values of composite index of corporate governance, and 
therefore these banks require greater efforts to improve their compliance with stated 
governance regulatory provisions. We also note thatm jority of banks are still far from 
perfection, and they can achieve the status of “good g verned bank” by improving their 
adherence in different dimensions of bank governance.  
Overall, our findings suggest that Indian banks work along the conventional lines, and 
therefore, put more efforts in protecting shareholder rights and information, and maintaining 
better disclosure and transparency levels.  The results indicate that banks in India focus less 
on contemporary debt governance principles. In the light of our results, we feel that Indian 
banks are required to pay a serious attention towards adherence of regulatory norms 
concerning board quality, audit and risk management practices in order to attain the status of 
well governed banks, and ultimately, to improve their financial health. 
 
  
                                                          
3 In the BoD approach, the index score may take a maximum value of 1 (benchmark bank with a high level of 

















Table 3: Corporate governance index and ranking of banks using alternative aggregation methodological frameworks 
Bank 
code 














B1 Allahabad Bank 0.9377 21 0.9678 21 -0.1031 21 0.8145 27 
B2 Andhra Bank 0.9523 13 0.9756 13 0.1121 14 0.8380 21 
B3 Axis Bank Ltd. 0.9812 8 0.9905 9 0.5097 6 0.9390 6 
B4 Bandhan Bank Ltd. 0.8716 39 0.9314 37 -0.8912 40 0.7852 32 
B5 Bank of Baroda 0.9314 27 0.9645 27 -0.107 22 0.8171 25 
B6 Bank of India 0.9078 35 0.9517 35 -0.4472 36 0.7649 38 
B7 Bank of Maharashtra 0.9428 17 0.9706 17 0.0474 18 0.8213 23 
B8 Canara Bank 0.9366 22 0.9672 22 -0.0374 20 0.8444 18 
B9 Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 0.9103 34 0.9531 34 -0.2837 32 0.8500 15 
B10 Central Bank of India 0.9173 31 0.9569 31 -0.2325 28 0.7811 34 
B11 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.9670 11 0.9832 11 0.1147 13 0.8932 10 
B12 Corporation Bank 0.8760 38 0.9339 36 -0.4546 37 0.7315 40 
B13 DCB Bank Ltd. 0.9984 4 1.0000 1 0.5583 5 0.9515 5 
B14 Dena Bank 0.9128 32 0.9544 32 -0.348 35 0.7710 37 
B15 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd 0.9912 6 1.0000 1 0.3686 8 0.9061 8 
B16 Federal Bank Ltd 1.0000 1 1.0000 1 0.725 4 0.9625 3 
B17 HDFC Bank Ltd. 0.9803 9 0.9901 10 0.3732 7 0.9140 7 
B18 ICICI Bank Ltd. 0.9494 14 0.9740 14 0.0527 16 0.8648 13 
B19 IDBI Bank Ltd. 0.9352 24 0.9665 24 -0.1671 26 0.8497 16 
B20 IDFC Bank Ltd. 1.0000 1 1.0000 1 0.935 1 0.9708 1 
B21 Indian Bank 0.9436 16 0.9710 16 0.0517 17 0.8660 12 
B22 Indian Overseas Bank 0.9286 28 0.9630 28 -0.1376 24 0.7838 33 
B23 IndusInd Bank Ltd. 0.9786 10 0.9911 8 0.2416 10 0.8997 9 
B24 Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.8634 40 0.8822 40 -0.6389 39 0.7418 39 
B25 Karnataka Bank Ltd 0.9398 20 0.9689 20 -0.1351 23 0.8390 19 
B26 Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.9882 7 1.0000 1 0.2718 9 0.8856 11 
B27 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 0.9195 30 0.9581 30 -0.3184 34 0.7765 36 
B28 Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd 0.9400 19 0.9691 19 -0.2133 27 0.8478 17 
B29 Oriental Bank of Commerce 0.9470 15 0.9728 15 0.1628 11 0.8315 22 
B30 Punjab and Sind Bank 0.9325 25 0.9651 25 -0.0173 19 0.8046 28 
B31 Punjab National Bank 0.9554 12 0.9772 12 0.1378 12 0.8606 14 
B32 RBL Bank Ltd. 0.9410 18 0.9696 18 -0.1586 25 0.8387 20 
B33 South Indian Bank Ltd 1.0000 1 1.0000 1 0.8357 2 0.9648 2 
B34 State Bank of India 0.8794 37 0.8973 39 -0.5485 38 0.7811 35 
B35 Syndicate Bank 0.9121 33 0.9540 33 -0.3107 33 0.7899 30 
B36 UCO Bank 0.9227 29 0.9598 29 -0.2833 31 0.7876 31 
B37 Union Bank of India 0.9353 23 0.9666 23 0.0982 15 0.8148 26 
B38 United Bank of India 0.9004 36 0.9106 38 -0.2624 29 0.7997 29 
B39 Vijaya Bank 0.9322 26 0.9649 26 -0.2686 30 0.8213 24 
B40 Yes Bank Ltd. 0.9955 5 1.0000 1 0.7683 3 0.9598 4 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis  
4.3.1 Choice of aggregation method and its impact on ranking of banks on CGI 
Corporate governance index obtained using constrained BoD model at 10 percent lower 
bound restriction (CGIBoD_0.10) is compared with three alternative composite indices –
constrained BoD with 5 percent lower bound restriction (CGIBOD_0.05), factor analysis based 
CGI index (CGIFactor) and equal weight CGI index (CGIEqual). In CGIBOD_0.05 and CGIBOD_0.10 
where the lower bound of weight constraint is restricted at 5 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively. CGIFactor is based on factor analysis, which is a non-frontier method and assigns 
data generated weights to each dimension in accordance to the proportion of the variance 
explained by the dataset (Vidoli and Fusco 2018). In the present study, the CGIFactor index of 
corporate governance is estimated using the command ‘ci_factor’ in the Compind package. 
Equal weight approach assigns a weight of 0.16 (1/m= 6) to each dimension, and all 
dimensions are linearly aggregated in a simpler way, implying every bank gives equal policy 
priority to each dimension of bank governance. The index values and ranking of banks 
corresponding to different alternative methods are also reported in Table 3. The statistical 
significance of differences in the ranking of banks across different alternative methodologies 
















The matrix of correlation coefficients of the ranks corresponding to four alternative 
indices reveals that the rank correlation coefficients are very high and statistically significant 
at 1 percent level (see Table 4). This indicates a gre ter rank concordance of banks on the 
corporate governance index obtained by employing different aggregation methods. The 
ranking of banks across alternative approaches remain st ble. Therefore, we can safely infer 
that BoD is a robust approach and the idea of this approach to assign endogenous generated 
weights to each dimension is more judicious than assigning fixed or equal or no weights for 
aggregation purpose. Overall, the construction of corporate governance index for banks using 
BoD is far superior to unweighted method. Our inference is in line with Wittrup and Bogetoft 
(2017) who conclude that weighted assessment is superior to unweighted, while determining 
the court workload. 
 
Table 4: Correlation between composite indices estimated across different methodological frameworks  







Constrained BoD (5%) 1.000 - - - 
Constrained BoD (10%) 0.984***  1.000 - - 
Factor Analysis 0.888***  0.954***  1.000 - 
Equal Weighting 0.936***  0.983***  0.991***  1.000 
Note: *** indicate significance at 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4.3.2 Lower bound weight choice and its impact on CGI 
An increase of the lower bound reflects the sensitivity of assigning weights to individual 
dimensions of CGI. In the present study, we capture he variations in weight restrictions 
under two limits – unrestricted with lower bound rest iction of 5 percent to a maximum of 16 
percent (assuming if equal weight of 1/m is assigned to each dimension). Accordingly, twelve 
alternative corporate governance indices are calculated (see Table C2 in the Appendix C for 
details on CGI scores corresponding to lower bound from 5 percent to 16 percent). Similar 
procedure is adopted for conducting a sensitivity analysis by Giambona and Vassallo (2013) 
in the construction of financial development index. From Table 5, we note that unlike 
traditional equal weight or unweighted approaches, constrained BoD approach rewards for 
policy priority by banks and penalizes under-performance in one or more dimensions. For 
instance, banks’ adherence to dimensions V and VI is rewarded by higher average aggregate 
weightage of 43 percent and 39 percent in the construction of CGI0.05 and CGI0.10, 
respectively. However, penalty is imposed on dimensions I (board effectiveness) and II (audit 
function) in terms of attaining lower 9 percent and 13 percent weightage, respectively, as can 
be seen from the weight’s matrix. As discussed by Cherchye et al. (2004), we also computed 
the CGI score with no weight restriction in BoD model. We find that unrestricted BoD 
allocates defective weight of zero percent to board effectiveness dimension and ignores the 
priority given by banks in improving board quality and over-emphasizes remuneration policy. 
On the other hand, setting a lower bound equivalent to equal weight in BoD eliminates the 
difference in the policy priorities by a bank in one dimension relative to other.  Thus, weight 
allocation is an important aspect because ultimately good corporate governance should, 









































Changes in lower 
bound restriction↓ 
Unrestricted (0%) 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.43 0.27 0.15 37 
5% 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.17 7 
6% 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.29 7 
7% 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.24 0.16 6 
8% 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.27 5 
9% 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.16 4 
10%# 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.16 3 
11% 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.23 3 
12% 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.22 3 
13% 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.21 3 
14% 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.19 2 
15% 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 2 
Equal weight (16%) 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 1 
Note: # Bank-wise weights assigned to each dimension are reported in Appendix Table C1.  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
All in all, the study observes that the constrained BoD approach is a robust approach for 
index construction, and successfully overcomes major methodological flaws that are present 
in traditional approaches. The constrained BoD model constructs a reliable composite index 
of corporate governance for individual banks by allowing a sensible weighting scheme for 
aggregation of normalised values of dimensional indices. These index values can be used for 
identifying the areas needed for improvement in the governance framework at the level of an 
individual bank as well as the banking industry as a whole. 
   
5. Conclusions  
This paper suggests a methodological framework to construct a non-parametric index of 
corporate governance for banks using the benefit-of-the-doubt (BoD) approach. This 
approach is unique, completely robust and distinctive in the sense that it requires no a priori 
knowledge of weights, and assigns endogenous weights ob ained from actual data to 
individual dimensions of governance to construct a omposite index of corporate governance. 
The framework suggested here shows how to use constrained BoD model to eliminate the 
problem with giving equal or subjective weights to key dimensions of governance of banks 
while constructing a composite index of corporate governance. In addition, we found that 
BoD is suitable for application to small samples, such as the case of our data. An illustration 
has been presented using a data set of 40 Indian banks in the year 2017. The data set is 
compiled using 58 qualitative and quantitative governance indicators as defined by relevant 
jurisdictions. In terms of managerial implications, the methodological framework presented 
in this study provides the policy formulators with the opportunity to not only rank the banks 
in accordance with their corporate governance performance but also identify strong and weak 
dimensions of governance in each bank. This, in tur, p ovides comprehensive guidance for 
policy formulators to assist them in identifying are s of corporate governance, which might 
require improvements by the banks. Further, the non-parametric corporate governance index 
serves as a classification system to monitor each bnk’s progress on adoption of governance 
principles. This system is crucial for designing and implementing targeted policies to 
improve overall governance quality of banks.  
The empirical results reveal that considerable efforts have been made by banks in 
adhering to corporate governance regulations in India in the last decade. This is evident from 
an estimated value of corporate governance index for sampled banks, which range between a 
minimum of 0.8634 and maximum of 1. Only three banks, namely South Indian Bank Ltd., 
IDFC Bank Ltd., and Federal Bank Ltd. tops the list and are found governance efficient with 
















approaches, our chosen BoD approach with weights con trained fully rewards the success of 
banks in obeying governance norms pertaining to shareholders’ right and information, and 
imposed a penalty on board effectiveness and audit f nction. This can be seen from the 
weights’ matrix. Thus, optimal weight allocation isan important aspect because equal 
weighting eliminates the difference in the policy priorities by a bank in one dimension 
relative to other. Also, the ranking of banks on the non-parametric corporate governance 
index remains robust enough and not very sensitive to the choice of aggregation method.  
On concluding note, the application of this suggested framework not only provides us 
with the ranking of banks in accordance of their adherence to governance regulations, but 
also helps us to identify strong and weak dimensions f governance for each bank. This 
identification could facilitate with redesigning of existing policies both at bank-level and 
industry-level. We believe that this framework would be greatly beneficial for improving 
corporate governance in the banking sector. However, th  key limitation of the proposed 
framework is that it cannot accommodate the negative or binary values of indicators or 
dimensional indices. The future research can be directed to overcome this drawback. In the 
future, research can also be directed to use of this framework to assess how the governance 
performance of banks has evolved over the period.  
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Table B1: Definition of dimensions and indicators of bank governance  
Dimensions ( : 1, ..., 6
m
I m ∈ ) Indicators in each dimension ( : 1, ...,
r
y r s∈ ) Regulatory/Legal Clause 
I. Board Effectiveness 
               (20)  
Whether a bank has no more than 15 directors on the board SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.1), 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
149(1.b), 2013 
At least 50 percent of the board comprise of non-executive directors SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.1), 
2015 
Board has not exceeding two nominee directors SEBI Clause 49 (II.B), 2015 
Board appoint at least one woman director SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.1), 
2015 
Executive director holds directorship/chairmanship on not more than three listed 
companies 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.B.2), 
2015 
Non-executive independent director hold directorship on not more than six listed 
companies 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.B.2), 
2015 
Board meets at least four times a year SEBI Clause 49 (II.D.1), 
2015 
Chairman of the board held the position for a minimum of five years Companies Act 2013 
Chairman of the board is non-executive director SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.2), 
2015 
Chairman and CEO are two separate persons on the board SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.2), 
2015 
Bank provide the details about the committee’s establi hment, mandate and 
composition including members who are independent in the corporate governance 
report; 0.5 if details are partially provided. 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.D), 2015 
Board include at least one-third of the independent irectors, in case of non-
executive chairman and at least one-half, in case of executive chairman 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.A.2), 
2015 
Suitable training is imparted to independent directors and is disclosed by bank in 
the report or on website  
SEBI Clause 49 (II.B.7), 
2015 
Independent director(s) has given a separate declaration of their independence 
included as part of corporate governance report 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.B), 2015 
Separate meeting of independent directors is held in financial year and details are 
disclosed in the report; 0.5 if meeting held and details are not provided 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.B.6), 
2015 
Board constitute nomination committee for appointment of directors SEBI Clause 49 (IV); BCBS, 
2015; Companies Act Clause 
178, 2013 
Bank board publishes its separate corporate governance report as a part of annual 
report  
SEBI Clause 49 (X), 2015 
Bank defines code of corporate governance SEBI Clause 49 (II.E) , 2015 
Board lays down a ‘code of conduct’ certificate from all board members and 
senior management  
SEBI Clause 49 (II.E) , 2015 
Bank establishes a vigil mechanism for directors and employees through whistle 
blower policy  
SEBI Clause 49 (II.F), 2015 
II. Audit Function  
             (9) 
Board constitute audit committee SEBI Clause 49 (III.A), 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
177(1), 2013 
Committee has minimum three members  SEBI Clause 49 (III.A.1) , 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
177(2), 2013 
Two-third members of audit committee are independent irectors  SEBI Clause 49 (III.A.1), 
2015 
Chairman is independent non-executive director SEBI Clause 49 (III.A.3), 
2015 
Internal audit procedure is defined in the report SEBI Clause 49 (III.D & E), 
2015; RBI, 2002 
Statutory auditor is appointed by board SEBI Clause 49 (III.D & E), 
2015; RBI, 2002 
Committee met at least four times a year SEBI Clause 49 (III.B), 2015 
Company secretory act as a secretory of audit committee SEBI Clause 49 (III.A.6), 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
134.f, 2013 
Bank include a certificate from either the auditors’ or practicing company 
secretaries regarding compliance of conditions of crporate governance and 
disclose it in the annual report 
SEBI Clause 49 (III.D & E), 
2015 
III. Risk Management  
            (5) 
Presence of risk management committee RBI, 2002; SEBI Clause 49 
(VI), 2015; BCBS, 2015 
Appointment of a chief risk officer  RBI, 2002; BCBS, 2015 
Bank disclose the size of risk management committee RBI, 2002 
















Bank have non- executive director as chairman of RMC RBI, 2002 
IV. Remuneration  
              (5) 
Board constitute a remuneration for overall oversight of management’s 
implementation of remuneration system. 
SEBI Clause 49 (IV), 2015; 
Companies Bill Clause 178, 
2013 
Independent director as a chairman of the committee. Companies Act 2013 
At least three members, with majority as non-executive directors. Companies Act 2013 
Information on payments of remuneration/ sitting fees to directors, if any paid is 
disclosed in the report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (II.C), 2015 
All directors are non-executive Companies Act 2013 
V. Shareholder Rights and  
          Information  
                 (11) 
Board constitute stakeholder’s grievance committee. SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.E.4), 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
178, 2013 
Non-executive director act as chairman of stakeholder grievance committee. SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.E.4), 
2015 
Compliance officer reporting to company secretary  RBI, 2002 
Committee look into the matters relating to investor c mplaints and board 
discloses the number of complaints received and resolv d in a financial year. 
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.E.4), 
2015; Companies Bill Clause 
178(6), 2013 
Board disclose the information on the last three annu l general meeting held in 
the annual report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.6), 
2015 
Bank board disclose the information regarding its listing on various stock 
exchanges in the report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.9), 
2015 
Disclose its dividend policy and dividend paid, if any, during the year in the 
report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.9), 
2015 
Bank disclose the information on market price of its share.  SEBI Clause 49 (XII.9), 
2015 
The procedure of share transfer system is explained comprehensively in the 
report.  
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.E.5), 
2015 
Disclosure on the information on the shareholding pattern of shares held by 
directors is made. 
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.9), 
2015 
Information about the proportion of dematerialised hares held by bank given in 
its annual report.  
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.9), 
2015 
VI. Disclosure and  
      Transparency  
              (8) 
Bank disclose the policy on dealing with Related Party Transactions. SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.A), 
2015 
Bank disclose the significant accounting policies adopted in Schedule- 17 of the 
annual report.  
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.B), 
2015 
Bank has a separate section on Management Discussion and Analysis as a part of 
annual report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.D), 
2015 
CEO/CFO certify to the board that board has complied accounting standards and 
code of conduct set by the bank. 
SEBI Clause 49 (IX), 2015 
Details of non-compliance by the company, penalties, and strictures imposed on 
the company by Stock Exchange or SEBI or any statutory authority, on any 
matter related to capital markets, during the last three years is disclosed in the 
annual report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.7.ii), 
2015 
Bank disclose information regarding the ways and means by which shareholders 
are informed.  
SEBI Clause 49 (XII.8), 
2015 
Bank disclose the details about resignation or cessation of directors along with the 
detailed reasons of resignation in report. 
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.F), 
2015 
A brief resume of new director or re-appointed director is included for the 
information to the shareholders 
SEBI Clause 49 (VIII.G), 
2015 
Total dimensions of corporate 
governance = 6 
Total corporate governance norms/indicators = 58  




















Tables C1 provides the optimal idiosyncratic weights (specific to dimension and for sampled banks) obtained 
using BoD model restricted at 10 percent lower bound. Table C2 reports the corporate governance index values 
for banks obtained corresponding to different weight restrictions on lower bound in BoD model. 
 
Table C1: Bank-specific weights generated for individual dimensions of CGI0.10 
 Dimensions I II III IV V VI 
Bank 
code 




















B1 Allahabad Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B2 Andhra Bank 0.139147 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.460853 0.1 
B3 Axis Bank Ltd. 0.183612 0.156672 0.359716 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B4 Bandhan Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.103993 0.496007 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B5 Bank of Baroda 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B6 Bank of India 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B7 Bank of Maharashtra 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B8 Canara Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B9 Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B10 Central Bank of India 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B11 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.218904 0.381096 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B12 Corporation Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B13 DCB Bank Ltd. 0.443328 0.156672 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B14 Dena Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B15 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B16 Federal Bank Ltd 0.191851 0.408149 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B17 HDFC Bank Ltd. 0.191851 0.408149 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B18 ICICI Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B19 IDBI Bank Limited 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B20 IDFC Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B21 Indian Bank 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B22 Indian Overseas Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B23 IndusInd Bank Ltd. 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B24 Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B25 Karnataka Bank Ltd. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 
B26 Karur Vysya Bank Ltd 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B27 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 0.187731 0.156672 0.1 0.355596 0.1 0.1 
B28 Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 0.139147 0.1 0.1 0.460853 0.1 0.1 
B29 Oriental Bank of Commerce 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B30 Punjab and Sind Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B31 Punjab National Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B32 RBL Bank Ltd. 0.127231 0.1 0.1 0.472769 0.1 0.1 
B33 South Indian Bank Ltd. 0.13294 0.1 0.46706 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B34 State Bank of India 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B35 Syndicate Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B36 UCO Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B37 Union Bank of India 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B38 United Bank of India 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
B39 Vijaya Bank 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
B40 Yes Bank Ltd. 0.283951 0.24229 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.173759 
 Average 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.16 


















Table C2: Sensitivity analysis of corporate governance index – Alternative CGI for different weight restrictions on lower bound varying from 0.05 to 0.16  
Bank 
code 
CGI 0.05 CGI0.06 CGI0.07 CGI0.08 CGI0.09 CGI0.10 CGI0.11 CGI0.12 CGI0.13 CGI0.14 CGI0.15 CGI0.16 Mean S.D 
B1 0.9678 0.9617 0.9556 0.9495 0.9436 0.9377 0.9319 0.9261 0.9205 0.9149 0.9094 0.9039 0.9352 0.0210 
B2 0.9756 0.9708 0.9661 0.9615 0.9569 0.9523 0.9478 0.9433 0.9389 0.9345 0.9301 0.9254 0.9502 0.0164 
B3 0.9905 0.9887 0.9868 0.9849 0.9831 0.9812 0.9794 0.9776 0.9757 0.9735 0.9709 0.9682 0.9800 0.0071 
B4 0.9314 0.9188 0.9065 0.8946 0.8830 0.8716 0.8606 0.8498 0.8393 0.8291 0.8191 0.8093 0.8678 0.0400 
B5 0.9645 0.9577 0.9510 0.9443 0.9378 0.9314 0.9250 0.9188 0.9126 0.9065 0.9005 0.8945 0.9287 0.0229 
B6 0.9517 0.9426 0.9336 0.9248 0.9162 0.9078 0.8995 0.8914 0.8834 0.8755 0.8678 0.8602 0.9045 0.0300 
B7 0.9706 0.9649 0.9593 0.9538 0.9483 0.9428 0.9375 0.9322 0.9270 0.9218 0.9167 0.9116 0.9405 0.0193 
B8 0.9672 0.9609 0.9547 0.9486 0.9425 0.9366 0.9307 0.9248 0.9191 0.9134 0.9078 0.9022 0.9340 0.0213 
B9 0.9531 0.9442 0.9355 0.9270 0.9186 0.9103 0.9023 0.8943 0.8865 0.8788 0.8713 0.8639 0.9071 0.0292 
B10 0.9569 0.9487 0.9407 0.9327 0.9250 0.9173 0.9098 0.9024 0.8951 0.8880 0.8809 0.8740 0.9143 0.0272 
B11 0.9832 0.9799 0.9766 0.9734 0.9702 0.9670 0.9638 0.9606 0.9563 0.9506 0.9450 0.9395 0.9638 0.0139 
B12 0.9339 0.9217 0.9098 0.8982 0.8870 0.8760 0.8652 0.8548 0.8445 0.8346 0.8248 0.8153 0.8721 0.0388 
B13 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9984 0.9962 0.9940 0.9917 0.9882 0.9841 0.9800 0.9944 0.0070 
B14 0.9544 0.9458 0.9373 0.9290 0.9208 0.9128 0.9049 0.8972 0.8896 0.8821 0.8747 0.8674 0.9097 0.0285 
B15 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9962 0.9912 0.9864 0.9815 0.9767 0.9720 0.9673 0.9602 0.9859 0.0143 
B16 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9983 0.9957 0.9930 0.9989 0.0023 
B17 0.9901 0.9881 0.9862 0.9842 0.9823 0.9803 0.9784 0.9765 0.9746 0.9711 0.9667 0.9624 0.9784 0.0086 
B18 0.9740 0.9690 0.9640 0.9591 0.9542 0.9494 0.9446 0.9398 0.9352 0.9305 0.9259 0.9214 0.9473 0.0173 
B19 0.9665 0.9601 0.9537 0.9475 0.9413 0.9352 0.9292 0.9232 0.9173 0.9115 0.9058 0.9002 0.9326 0.0217 
B20 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
B21 0.9710 0.9654 0.9598 0.9544 0.9490 0.9436 0.9383 0.9331 0.9279 0.9228 0.9177 0.9127 0.9413 0.0191 
B22 0.9630 0.9559 0.9490 0.9421 0.9353 0.9286 0.9221 0.9156 0.9092 0.9029 0.8966 0.8905 0.9259 0.0238 
B23 0.9911 0.9893 0.9876 0.9858 0.9827 0.9786 0.9745 0.9704 0.9664 0.9624 0.9584 0.9535 0.9751 0.0128 
B24 0.8822 0.8784 0.8746 0.8708 0.8671 0.8634 0.8597 0.8560 0.8524 0.8488 0.8453 0.8418 0.8617 0.0132 
B25 0.9689 0.9630 0.9571 0.9512 0.9455 0.9398 0.9341 0.9286 0.9231 0.9176 0.9123 0.9070 0.9373 0.0203 
B26 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9981 0.9934 0.9882 0.983 0.9779 0.9728 0.9678 0.9629 0.9567 0.9834 0.0156 
B27 0.9581 0.9501 0.9423 0.9346 0.9270 0.9195 0.9122 0.9049 0.8978 0.8900 0.8818 0.8737 0.9160 0.0273 
B28 0.9691 0.9631 0.9572 0.9514 0.9456 0.9400 0.9344 0.9288 0.9233 0.9179 0.9126 0.9069 0.9375 0.0203 
B29 0.9728 0.9675 0.9623 0.9571 0.9520 0.9470 0.942 0.9370 0.9321 0.9273 0.9225 0.9177 0.9448 0.0180 
B30 0.9651 0.9584 0.9518 0.9453 0.9389 0.9325 0.9263 0.9201 0.9140 0.9080 0.9021 0.8962 0.9299 0.0226 
B31 0.9772 0.9727 0.9683 0.9640 0.9596 0.9554 0.9511 0.9469 0.9427 0.9386 0.9345 0.9304 0.9535 0.0153 
B32 0.9696 0.9637 0.9580 0.9522 0.9466 0.9410 0.9355 0.9300 0.9246 0.9193 0.9140 0.9088 0.9386 0.0199 
B33 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9992 0.9999 0.0002 
B34 0.8973 0.8937 0.8901 0.8865 0.8829 0.8794 0.8759 0.8725 0.8690 0.8656 0.8622 0.8589 0.8778 0.0126 
B35 0.9540 0.9453 0.9368 0.9284 0.9202 0.9121 0.9041 0.8963 0.8886 0.8811 0.8737 0.8664 0.9089 0.0287 
B36 0.9598 0.9521 0.9446 0.9372 0.9299 0.9227 0.9156 0.9087 0.9018 0.8950 0.8884 0.8818 0.9198 0.0256 
B37 0.9666 0.9601 0.9538 0.9475 0.9414 0.9353 0.9293 0.9233 0.9175 0.9117 0.9060 0.9003 0.9327 0.0217 
B38 0.9106 0.9086 0.9065 0.9044 0.9024 0.9004 0.8983 0.8963 0.8943 0.8923 0.8903 0.8884 0.8994 0.0073 
B39 0.9649 0.9582 0.9516 0.9450 0.9386 0.9322 0.9259 0.9197 0.9136 0.9076 0.9016 0.8958 0.9296 0.0227 
B40 1.0000 1.0000 0.9996 0.9982 0.9969 0.9955 0.9942 0.9928 0.9915 0.9901 0.9887 0.9871 0.9945 0.0045 
















1) This paper presents the methodological framework to construct a non-parametric corporate 
governance index for banking firms using DEA based ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ approach. 
2)     This paper provides a comprehensive multi-dimensional framework for assessing the 
corporate governance of a bank. 
3) An illustration is made using a data set of 40 Indian banks operating in the year 2017. 
4) The constrained BoD model used assigns endogenous weights to individual dimensions of 
bank governance. 
 
